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We propose that executive team power strengthens a cycle of “homosocial reproduc-
tion” that is interrupted only when teams face such compelling needs for diversity as
poor organizational performance, high corporate diversification, and tough market
competition. Hypothesis tests in data from major Dutch newspaper publishers over 25
years did not support many of our benchmark expectations. Apparently, top manage-
ment teams tend to close ranks when environmental complexity and pressure increase.
Explanations and new research avenues are discussed.
In 1983, Jeffrey Pfeffer wrote his seminal article
on organizational demographics. In this paper,
Pfeffer argued that organization scientists focused
too much on unobservable psychological states,
such as perceptions and attitudes, in explaining
organizational phenomena and did not take much
notice of more basic, structural, antecedent factors,
such as the objective demography of organizations.
Organizational demography refers to the distribu-
tion of organization members along any demo-
graphic trait or any set of demographic traits (Have-
man, 1995; Pfeffer, 1983). The purpose of Pfeffer’s
statement was to encourage the development of
hypotheses concerning both the causes and conse-
quences of variations in organizational demogra-
phy. A year later, Donald Hambrick and Phyllis
Mason (1984) made a similar plea for studying or-
ganizational demographics at the level of the dom-
inant coalitions or upper echelons of organizations
(that is, their top management teams). They argued
that, as an organization is a reflection of its top
managers, studying the consequences of differ-
ences in the composition of top management teams
is a worthwhile endeavor. Both papers have been
very influential in the organization sciences do-
main. Their importance resides in how they put the
individual back into organization theory, which
had become predominantly macro (Sørensen,
2000). On the innovative character of this ap-
proach, Carroll and Harrison commented the fol-
lowing: “Organizational demography is one of a
few genuinely new and exciting areas of organiza-
tions research. It is also an area with potential to
unify the increasingly disparate micro and macro
ends of the field” (1998: 664).
Both papers inspired many scholars to research
the proposed links empirically. When one reviews
these empirical studies, at least two conclusions
can be drawn. First, although scholars have exam-
ined many dimensions of organizational demogra-
phy (for instance, the average and the spread of
tenure, gender, ethnic background, and age in
teams and organizations), the unevenness—or, the
heterogeneity—in the distribution of length of ser-
This research was supported by grants from the Dutch
Bedrijfsfonds voor de Pers, from the Dutch Organization
for Scientific Research (NWO), and from the Maastricht
Research School of Economics of Technology and Orga-
nizations (METEOR) of the University of Maastricht. We
thank this journal’s editor and three anonymous referees,
and participants in the top management team workshop
at the second European Academy of Management Con-
ference in Stockholm (May 2002) for their useful com-
ments. We gratefully acknowledge the data management
efforts of Joyce Wicherts, Charlotte Rekko, and Jacqueline
Pennings. Special thanks goes to Robert van Well and
Walter Hendriks for data collection. Of course, all errors
are ours.
 Academy of Management Journal
2004, Vol. 47, No. 5, 633–656.
633
vice, or tenure, is the demographic variable of pri-
mary interest (Carroll & Harrison, 1998). Second,
the overwhelming majority of studies have focused
on the consequences of demography for organiza-
tional outcomes such as innovation, diversifica-
tion, adaptiveness, and performance (for a review,
see Williams and O’Reilly [1998]). We, however,
agree with Lawrence (1997), who proposed that in
order to fully understand the consequences of or-
ganizational demography it is essential to also
probe the antecedents of demographic diversity, or
the lack thereof (see also Haveman, 1995; Mittman,
1992). Pfeffer underscored this need to look at de-
mographics in a dynamic way as follows: “Because
organizational demography is determined by the
past history of the social composition of net flows
into it . . . understanding organizational demogra-
phy requires understanding demographic composi-
tion at some initial point and the subsequent flows
into and out of the organization” (1997: 87). In
other words, to understand the origins and conse-
quences of specific differences in the demographic
distributions of organizations, it is essential to
study their metabolisms—that is, the entry and exit
of (characteristics of) individuals into and out of
these social aggregates.
This metabolic perspective is important because
it has the potential to offer new insights into the
classical tension in the social sciences between the
individual human being and the aggregate social
system. Specifically, studying the demographic
metabolism of social organizations may help to ex-
plain the dynamics of the aggregate entity as well.
On the one hand, it is essential for scholars’ under-
standing of social change because replacing outgo-
ing members with different newcomers is one im-
portant way for formal organizations to adapt their
courses of action (Haveman, 1995; Schneider,
Smith, Taylor, & Fleenor, 1998). On the other hand,
the same replacement process may rather be geared
toward the stability of a social system and to the
perpetuation rather than adaptation of its behavior.
Such stability happens when organizations form
demographic “clone” of themselves through strict
reproduction of existing characteristics through
hiring, firing, socialization, and promotion poli-
cies. In this case, outgoing members are replaced by
relatively identical newcomers. It follows that de-
mographic research, by linking individual behavior
with system dynamics, helps to build bridges be-
tween different levels of analysis.
The specific object of our present research effort
was to see how demographic metabolism causes
top management teams to become either homoge-
neous or heterogeneous. For this purpose, we ana-
lyzed the characteristics of managers entering into
and exiting from top management teams vis-a`-vis
those of incumbent managers. In so doing, this
article reports the results from one of the few stud-
ies that we know of in which the dynamics of
demographic heterogeneity were studied systemat-
ically with a simultaneous focus on its dual con-
stituents: the characteristics of those who enter into
and those who exit from a focal top management
team (see Keck & Tushman [1993] for another ex-
ample of such a study). We claim that, although top
management teams tend to reproduce themselves
in terms of demographic characteristics, a conflict-
ing force simultaneously operates that might pull
teams toward diversity. In this way, the current
work is a first answer to Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter’s
(2003) plea for longitudinal studies of the evolution
of management team composition. In their cross-
sectional study of 816 U.S. entrepreneurial found-
ing teams, Ruef and coauthors (2003) found strong
support for the “homophily” hypothesis (McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), which states that
new members are selected into teams on the basis
of the similarity of their demographic characteris-
tics, such as ethnicity and gender, to those of past
and/or existing team members.
As a starting point, we used Schneider’s (1987)
attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) theory as the
theoretical basis for our hypotheses. The ASA
model is an evolutionary theory of group dynamics
that nicely complements the general homophily
argument by focusing on the micro processes of
entry into and exit from teams. The ASA theory
provides an important account of how top manage-
ment teams, through so-called team-level cycles of
attraction, selection, and attrition, generally gravi-
tate toward homogeneity. However, rational-eco-
nomic arguments suggested to us that countervail-
ing forces at an organizational level might well
undermine ASA cycles. Specifically, we theorized
that the cycle of homosocial reproduction cannot
be sustained when top management teams face a
compelling need for diversity. We posited that such
is the case when organizational performance is
poor, corporate diversification is high, and market
competition is tough. So, we focused on factors
both inside and outside organizations to under-
stand the demographic distribution of top manage-
ment teams, as advocated by Keck and Tushman
(1993), Lawrence (1997), and Ruef et al. (2003).
Finally, we introduced an executive team’s power
as a variable that might moderate the need-for-
diversity effect. We tested our hypotheses using
data on the dynamics of the composition of the top
executive management teams of the five largest
newspaper publishers in The Netherlands over the
period 1970–94.
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In advance, it is useful to point to an important
methodological problem that precludes studying
selective entry into versus exit from a team in the
same way. Specifically, although our executive
management team data allowed us to observe the
team from which an individual left, we could not
observe the pool of candidates from which an en-
trant was chosen into a team. Therefore, with re-
gard to entry, on the one hand, we could only
hypothesize on the result of a selective entry pro-
cess under different predefined circumstances, as
an indirect indication of the nature of the underly-
ing selection process. With regard to exit, on the
other hand, we could hypothesize directly on se-
lective exit as we did observe which individuals
were “selected out” of teams and which were not.
For these reasons, we specified separate hypothe-
ses for selective entry and selective exit.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Forces Pulling toward Homogeneity
Theoretical exercises on the dynamics of organi-
zational demography have emphasized the ten-
dency of a social aggregate to reproduce its own
demographic composition. Pfeffer (1997: 99), for
instance, observed that “demography has a ten-
dency to perpetuate itself—to use Kanter’s (1977)
apt phrase, to exhibit ‘homosocial reproduction.’”
The attraction-selection-attrition model of Ben-
jamin Schneider (1987) provides an interesting ac-
count of the dynamics of homosocial reproduction.
The original model focuses on “soft” characteristics,
such as personalities and attitudes. The ASA model
outlines the forces operating to restrict organizational
diversity in members’ characteristics, producing so-
called trait homogenization (Schaubroeck, Ganster, &
Jones, 1998). That is, organizations move toward
member homogeneity because individuals are at-
tracted to, selected by, and stay with organizations
that suit their personality characteristics (Schaubro-
eck et al., 1998). This homogenization tendency,
which Barnard (1938) had already suggested, is in
line with evidence from the vocational psychology,
organizational choice, turnover, and human resource
management literatures. Indeed, recent empirical
findings support the ASA model’s central proposi-
tion that organizations are relatively homogeneous
with respect to the personalities of their members
(Schaubroeck et al., 1998; Schneider et al., 1998). For
instance, Schneider and his colleagues (1998) used
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to assess the person-
ality of almost 13,000 managers from 142 organiza-
tions. Their key finding was that a substantial part of
personality variation can be explained by organiza-
tional membership. Unfortunately, the empirical re-
search on the ASA model to date has not shed light
on the exact causes of the observed homogeneity. Is it
the psychological need to be similar to others with
whom one works that drives the ASA process, or is it
generated by situational pressures, or both (Law-
rence, 1997)?
Important for the present study is that this stream
of research suggests “that employers tend to replace
organizational members with people who are sim-
ilar to themselves” (Lawrence, 1997: 18), leading to
homogeneity especially at the upper management
level of organizations (Schneider et al., 1998). This
view extends to include demographic similarity.
Westphal and Zajac (1995) and Zajac and Westphal
(1996) provided at least three plausible reasons for
a tendency toward homogeneity. First, there is am-
ple evidence that similarity on a salient dimension
enhances interpersonal attraction. This is known as
the similarity-attraction principle. Second, accord-
ing to self-categorization theory, people derive
higher self-esteem and strengthened self-identity
from perceived group membership. That is, “Given
that demographic similarity provides a salient basis
for group membership, people may favor (e.g., pre-
fer to hire) demographically similar individuals.
Alternatively, people may seek to construct or
maintain homogeneous groups in order to increase
the salience of group membership, thus maintain-
ing or enhancing their self-esteem and identity”
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995: 61). Third, apart from
these two social-psychological mechanisms, there
are also sociopolitical reasons why top managers
might prefer to work with demographically similar
individuals. Hiring and promoting people who are
similar to oneself on, for instance, functional back-
ground or strategic preferences helps to perpetuate
and institutionalize managerial power. In addition,
similarity facilitates communication within a team
and diminishes the likelihood of conflict and
power struggles (Pfeffer, 1983; Boone, van Olffen, &
van Witteloostuijn, 1998). A final reason for re-
cruiting like individuals may be to fulfill a psycho-
logical need for stability and to reduce behavioral
uncertainty in a work environment. Hiring similar
others enhances the perceived predictability of the
newcomers’ behavior and thus, the predictability of
the working environment.
So the argument of the ASA model is that top
executive management teams tend to selectively
hire and fire to the effect that their own demo-
graphic characteristics are strengthened, thus pro-
moting their social reproduction. This argument is
similar to the one proposed in the context of the
so-called homophily mechanism (McPherson et al.,
2001), which has been studied for such features as
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ethnicity (Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990) and gender
(Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden, & Spaeth, 1996). Ruef
and colleagues (2003) provided evidence that ho-
mophily dominated economic mechanisms favor-
ing diversity in ethnicity, gender, and occupation
in 816 founding teams of U.S. entrepreneurial ven-
tures. As their study was cross-sectional, focusing
on team formation, they could not observe the dy-
namics of team evolution over time. In our context
of selective top manager turnover, we derived hy-
potheses on the top executive management team
entry and exit process. For exit, we compared each
and every team member’s demographic similarity
to the rest of his or her team and thus studied
similarity’s impact on the probability of exit. In
other words, we could directly observe the phe-
nomenon of interest. Concerning the exit process,
this ASA argument suggests that individuals who
do not fit a team tend to leave or “be relieved,” as
has consistently been shown in the research on
turnover (Carroll & Harrison, 1998; Schneider et al.,
1998). That is,
Hypothesis 1. The higher an individual execu-
tive’s demographic dissimilarity to a top exec-
utive management team, the higher her or his
likelihood of exit from the team.
We refrained from formulating Hypothesis 1’s mir-
ror image for entry, because we could not observe
the pool of candidates from which entrants are
selected. What we could do, however, was to study
selective entry under different circumstances.
Westphal and Zajac (1995) applied ideas similar to
ours to board of directors selection, adding the role
of power. They hypothesized that the extent to
which incumbent CEOs can realize their preference
for demographically similar new directors depends
on the power of the CEOs vis-a`-vis the boards.
Westphal and Zajac tested several hypotheses on a
sample of 413 Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from
1986 to 1991. Supporting their arguments, they
found that: “(1) when incumbent CEOs are more
powerful than their boards of directors, new direc-
tors are likely to be demographically similar to the
firm’s CEO; (2) when boards are more powerful
than their CEOs, new directors resemble the exist-
ing board; and (3) greater demographic similarity
between the CEO and the board is likely to result in
more generous CEO compensation contracts”
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995: 60).
These ideas can also be applied in the context of
the present study, the selection of new executive
managers into top management teams. Following
ASA logic, we hypothesized that top management
teams reproduce their own demographic character-
istics. However, a first prerequisite of any type of
reproduction is a top teams’ power to reproduce—
that is, to actually decide which candidates to hire.
We therefore expected that the extent to which top
executive management teams select demographi-
cally similar newcomers increases with their orga-
nizational power, which depends on their power
vis-a`-vis their boards of directors. Thus,
Hypothesis 2. The higher top executive man-
agement team power vis-a`-vis board of direc-
tors power, the greater the demographic simi-
larity of entrant to incumbent executives.
Similarly, a powerful team will seek to “facilitate”
the exclusion of dissimilar members. As a result,
team power should positively moderate the impact
of demographic distance on the likelihood of team
exit, which gives
Hypothesis 3. The higher top executive man-
agement team power vis-a`-vis board of direc-
tors power, the higher the likelihood that a
demographically dissimilar executive will exit
a team.
Forces Pulling toward Heterogeneity
To date, to our knowledge, there is no direct
statistical evidence concerning the consequences of
homosocial reproduction for organizational effec-
tiveness. However, Schneider and his coauthors
stated the following:
On the issue of organizational effectiveness, how-
ever, threads from the more qualitative results of
extensive case studies presented earlier by Argyris
(1958) and later by Schein (1992), combined with
research in the groups literature (Guzzo and Shea,
1992; Herriot and Pemberton, 1995), create a fabric
suggestive of the potential importance of the modal
personality construct. In all of the citations, hetero-
geneity was found to yield increased adaptability
and flexibility in dealing with difficult tasks involv-
ing demands for creativity and innovation. In other
words, as predicted by Schneider (1987), it can be
inferred that (a) organizations tend toward homoge-
neity of personality and (b) homogeneity of person-
ality is not beneficial to long-term organizational
effectiveness. (1998: 468)
Why is organizational or team heterogeneity po-
tentially so important for organizational effective-
ness? Small group research contains some indica-
tions. Many social and cognitive psychological
studies have discussed the effects of group variety
on group behavior and outcomes (Boone et al.,
1998). According to the notion of requisite variety
(Weick, 1979), within-team diversity must be
matched with the complexity and nonroutineness
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of a decision environment for a team to perform
well (Milliken & Martins, 1996). When a group
faces a complex and nonroutine decision environ-
ment, its performance may benefit from having a
wide range of viewpoints that it can discuss and
evaluate critically to arrive at appropriate solu-
tions. High team diversity is likely to facilitate the
production of such a wide spectrum of perspec-
tives. As people are the carriers of cognitive capac-
ities and as there are limits to the cognitive com-
plexity any single individual can handle (Cyert &
March, 1963), each team member can provide only
part of the diversity needed to solve a problem.
Varying individual cognitive resources must there-
fore be pooled to form diverse teams that can solve
complex problems. In this respect, demographic
heterogeneity can be regarded as a “proxy for cog-
nitive heterogeneity, representing innovativeness,
problem-solving abilities, creativity, diversity of in-
formation sources and perspectives, openness to
change and willingness to challenge and be chal-
lenged” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 125). Em-
pirical research indeed has revealed that in solving
complex and nonroutine problems, groups are more
effective when composed of members with a variety
of skills, knowledge, abilities, and perspectives
(Shaw, 1976). This advantage is particularly evident
in innovative activity (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).
The research noted above suggests that in com-
plex and dynamic environments there are compel-
ling rational-economic reasons for organizations to
interrupt the homogenization processes caused by
ASA cycles. As Schaubroeck and his colleagues
(1998) put it, the need for diversity and homogeni-
zation are in continuous conflict. We argue that as
long as the process of internal team homogeniza-
tion does not hamper favorable external environ-
mental selection outcomes, homosocial reproduc-
tion is sustainable. We therefore expect that the
interruption only occurs when the need for diver-
sity is very compelling. In their study of top man-
agement team dynamics, and environmental and
organizational context, Keck and Tushman (1993)
reported evidence that executive turnover that in-
creases top team heterogeneity is particularly
prominent in turbulent circumstances. In their
study of 104 U.S. cement producers in the 1900–86
period, they found that top management team en-
tries and exits were positively associated with orga-
nizational reorientation and technological change,
producing increased functional and tenure heteroge-
neity. In the current article, we contend that the need
for team diversity is higher under any of the following
three circumstances: low performance, high diversi-
fication, and tough competition.
First, concerning organizational performance, it
is clear that the urge to try something new and to
change the course of action increases when perfor-
mance is low. This observation follows immedi-
ately from the literature on organizational decline
and turnaround strategies (van Witteloostuijn,
1998) and from the organizational change and
learning literatures at large (Greve, 2003). For ex-
ample, Boeker and Goodstein indeed observed in a
sample of 290 hospitals that “hospitals change the
composition of their board to adapt to changing
environmental contingencies but that the hospitals’
performance moderates the rate of their response,
with poorer performers being more willing to initi-
ate changes in board composition than strong per-
formers” (1991: 805). Similarly, as team diversity is
assumed to be associated with willingness and
openness to change (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996), we expect that poor performance, which
triggers a need for change, will stimulate hiring
more dissimilar managers and/or preventing dis-
similar managers from leaving a team, partly be-
cause team reproduction is harder to sustain in the
face of resistance from important organizational
stakeholders if performance is low.
Second, relating to diversification strategies, the
general idea is that complex strategies require a
broader pool of managerial knowledge and capabil-
ities than relatively simple strategies. This line of
argument is reflected in the finding in small group
research that compositional diversity particularly
enhances team performance if groups face complex
and nonroutine tasks (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale,
1999; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Therefore,
we expect that companies that diversify away from
their core businesses need to increase top executive
management team diversity to successfully imple-
ment the diversification strategy, per the principle
of requisite variety (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
Third, regarding competitive intensity, we expect
that competition for scarce resources will increase
a team’s need for diversity. In this context, it is
useful to refer to evolutionary biology, which de-
scribes several mechanisms that increase the ge-
netic variation of a biological species. One such
mechanism is “gene flow” (Ricklefs, 1979; Temple-
ton, 2002). Gene flow sometimes occurs when new
organisms enter a population by migration from
another population. If they mate within the popu-
lation, the genetic variation of the gene pool of the
species is increased. As this outbreeding increases
variation, it tends to increase the adaptive capacity
and thus the survival chances of the species. This
mechanism is especially important when the com-
petitive pressure for resources is high. Analo-
gously, we expect that top management teams tend
to “outbreed” and increase their “genetic” variation
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(that is, their diversity) when competition is tough
in order to preserve or increase the survival
chances of their organizations. Researchers in the
area of organizational learning have explored sim-
ilar arguments, suggesting a positive correlation be-
tween intraorganizational ecological processes of
variation and selection on the one hand and orga-
nizational learning performance on the other hand,
particularly in turbulent environments (Aldrich,
1999; Burgelman, 1994; Herriot & Pemberton,
1995).
On the basis of this ASA-disruption logic, we can
derive hypotheses on one main effect and three
interaction effects with regard to top executive
management team metabolism. For one, the direct
effect of an increased need for diversity on demo-
graphic similarity is captured in the next hypothe-
sis for the executive entry case. If entry were the
result of a strictly rational-economic process, fol-
lowing the diversity requirements of the specified
context, we would expect
Hypothesis 4. The higher the need for diversity
owing to poor performance, high diversifica-
tion, and tough competition, the smaller the
demographic similarity of entrant to incum-
bent top executives.
We hypothesized in the previous section that
teams have a “natural” tendency to reproduce
themselves in terms of member characteristics, es-
pecially when they have the power to do so. From
the rational-economic argument it follows, how-
ever, that this homosocial reproduction tendency
will not be sustainable when external pressures for
diversity mount. In other words, the power effect
will then be counterbalanced by the rationality ar-
gument. With respect to the entry process, this
counterbalancing implies that the selective entry of
similar members into powerful teams will be
blocked when organizations face a high need for
diversity. We therefore expect that the need for
diversity will moderate the impact of team power
on entrant similarity. This argument results in a
qualified version of Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 5. The higher top executive man-
agement team power vis-a`-vis board of directors
power, the greater the demographic similarity of
entrant to incumbent executives. This effect will
be less pronounced when the need for diversity is
high owing to poor performance, high diversifi-
cation, and tough competition.
Similarly, concerning the exit process, we expect
that the ASA-driven expulsion of the dissimilar
from a team will be interrupted on rational-eco-
nomic grounds if the need for diversity becomes
high. In other words, the need-for-diversity vari-
ables will moderate the impact of demographic dis-
tance on the exit rate. This argument results in a
qualified version of Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 6. The higher an individual execu-
tive’s demographic dissimilarity to a top exec-
utive management team, the higher her or his
likelihood of exit from the team. This effect
will be less pronounced when the need for
diversity is high owing to poor performance,
high diversification, and tough competition.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that powerful teams will
seek to facilitate the exclusion of dissimilar mem-
bers. Again, we expect the need for diversity to
produce an external counterforce against this inter-
nal reinforcing effect of top executive management
team power. This expectation implies the following
three-way interaction:
Hypothesis 7. The higher top executive man-
agement team power vis-a`-vis board of direc-
tors power, the higher the likelihood that a
demographically dissimilar executive will exit
a team. This effect will be less pronounced
when the need for diversity is high owing to
poor performance, high diversification, and
tough competition.
METHODOLOGY
Data
The hypotheses were tested on data collected
from the five largest independent newspaper pub-
lishers in The Netherlands: NDU/Reed-Elsevier,
Perscombinatie, De Telegraaf, VNU, and Wegener.
The window of observation covered the 25 years
from 1970 through 1994. Data on the independent
publisher NDU pertain to 1970–78, when it was
taken over by Reed-Elsevier, effectively entering
the Dutch newspaper market in 1979. The five com-
panies existing after 1978 are referred to as the Big
Five. This sampling frame results in data on 125
(5  25) year-team combinations. We collected
both organization-level variables and information
on the composition of the top executive manage-
ment teams and boards of directors. The organiza-
tion-level (financial) data came from the yearly an-
nual accounts of the companies. The demographic
information on members of the executive manage-
ment teams and boards of directors was obtained
from multiple sources, including the annual ac-
counts, membership lists of the NDP (the nation’s
professional association of newspaper editors), edi-
tions of Who Is Who in The Netherlands?, and
personnel archives of the publishing companies.
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In the 1970–94 period, the Dutch newspaper and
publishing industries went through a number of
important changes that triggered a consolidation
process (Boone, Carroll, & van Witteloostuijn, 2002;
van Witteloostuijn, Boone, Hendriks, van Iterson,
Olie, & van Well, 1998). The two key changes were
caused by cultural and technological shifts in the
publisher’s broader environment, reflecting both a
gradual decline in demand for newspapers and a
major reshuffling of the market’s niche structure.
First, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were character-
ized by the incremental collapse of the “pillarized”
structure of Dutch society, in which various soci-
etal “pillars” had their own sociopolitical institu-
tions, including political parties, labor unions, and
daily newspapers. For example, the Catholic south
of The Netherlands was served by the KVP (the
Catholic People’s Party), the KAB (the Catholic La-
bor Movement), and de Volkskrant, a national,
daily Catholic newspaper. With “depillarization,”
these niche-specific institutions merged into larger,
more generic entities (for instance, the broad Chris-
tian Democratic Party and the Christian Labor
Union), or disappeared altogether (there is no Catho-
lic national daily anymore). Second, the newspaper
medium was confronted with increasing competition
from alternative media, particularly television. In the
1960s and 1970s, the number of state-owned televi-
sion channels grew from one to three, and in the
1980s and 1990s the number of commercial televi-
sion channels exploded from none to more than ten.
By and large, newspaper publishers (at least, the
surviving ones) responded in two ways. On the one
hand, mergers and acquisitions increased exponen-
tially. Concentration reduced the number of news-
paper publishers from dozens to about ten. From
1950 to 1994, the number of independent newspa-
per publishers declined from 58 to 14. From this
process, a dominant Big Five emerged: in 1968,
their aggregated market share was approximately
50 percent, and this value increased to about 93
percent in 1995. The organizational form of the
multinewspaper publisher transformed from being
the exception in the 1960s to the rule in the 1990s.
On the other hand, many publishers diversified
into adjacent information industries, ranging from
books and magazines to radio and television chan-
nels. For example, Wegener moved into such activ-
ities as special interest magazines, direct marketing
services, music retailing, and film, music, radio,
television, and video production.
Analyses
We estimated two types of models to test our
hypotheses. First, we modeled the entry process by
comparing the demographic characteristics of new
executive managers with those of their incumbent
counterparts. In this case, the dependent variable
was a distance measure of the demographic char-
acteristics of entrants vis-a`-vis incumbents that was
recorded each time an entry was observed (West-
phal & Zajac, 1995). Second, we modeled the exit
process at the individual manager level of analysis.
This was possible because we could observe who
did and who did not exit at each moment in time.
We used event history or survival analysis to model
the exit event as a function of the demographic
distance of a focal manager from his or her incum-
bent colleagues.
The dependent variable in the event history
framework was the instantaneous rate of individual
exit from a top executive management team, which
was defined as
r(t) 
lim
dt 3 0
Pr(exit t,t  dt  no exit by t)
dt ,
where r was the hazard rate and Pr(exit t,t  dt  no
exit by t) was the probability of a manager experi-
encing exit between t  dt, conditional on being at
risk for the event at time t. Note that in the present
case t represented a manager’s tenure on a team.
The specific rate models we estimated were piece-
wise constant rate exponential models of the gen-
eral form
r(t)  exp(alAa),
where al was a constant coefficient associated with
the lth tenure period, A was a row vector of covari-
ates, and a was an associated vector of coefficients
assumed not to vary across time periods (Blossfeld
& Rohwer, 1995; Carroll & Hannan, 2000). The
piecewise constant rate model was useful because
then no specific assumptions were made about the
age (in this case, tenure) dependence of the exit
process. Exit rates were specified as “log-linear”
functions of the covariates, so estimated failure
rates were constrained to be positive. Because the
covariates varied over time, we split team histories
into yearly intervals and updated covariates at the
beginning of each interval. Time-varying covariates
imply repeated observations of the same subject. As
a result, the assumption of independence of the
observations was highly questionable, meaning
that conventional estimation of the variance-
covariance matrix of the coefficients (and, hence,
the standard errors) was not appropriate. Therefore,
we evaluated the significance of the estimated co-
efficients by means of robust standard errors based
on the “Huber/White/sandwich” estimator of vari-
ance, which takes the clustering of observations on
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individuals into account. We used STATA (version
6.0) to estimate the vector of parameters by the
method of maximum likelihood.
Variables
From board membership lists and additional data
gathered on site, we could record all executive
team entrances and exits. During the 25-year obser-
vation period, the top management teams of the Big
Five publishing companies were populated by 66
different executives. The total number of manager-
year observations was 458. The average size of a
management team was 4.31 executives (s.d. 
1.40). A total of 46 new entrants and 45 exiting
managers were recorded. After screening for miss-
ing (demographic) values, we had an effective data
set for analysis of 40 entrants and 38 exiters. On the
average, teams experienced mutation (that is, an
exit or an entry) every 1.5 years. The total number
of different board members in the same period was
122. The average board size (7.89, s.d.  2.15) was
almost double that of the average executive man-
agement team.
The overall demographic distance of entrants
and exiters from incumbent team members was
assessed by means of four demographic character-
istics, one of which was continuous and three of
which were categorical. The continuous demo-
graphic variable was the executives’ age. As is con-
ventional (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1995), demo-
graphic distance, defined as focal individual i’s
dissimilarity to his or her team on the given vari-
able, was the mean squared Euclidean distance
from each incumbent team member j, calculated as:
(Xi  Xj)2/(n  1) ,
where Xi is the age of focal individual i, Xj is the age
of incumbent j with i not equal to j, and n is the
number of team members.
The three dichotomous categorical variables
were career path, industry experience, and aca-
demic status. Career path referred to whether an
individual had made a career within the sampled
company (1) or was attracted from outside the or-
ganization (0). Industry experience related to more
than three years previous experience within the
publishing industry (1  “yes” and 0  “no”).
Finally, academic status measured whether the in-
dividual possessed a university degree (1) or not
(0). To calculate i’s similarity to the rest of her or
his team on these three characteristics, we used
Blau’s index, here defined as the squared propor-
tion of team members with the same background.
To render this a measure of dissimilarity as well,
we subtracted this squared proportion from 1.
All four distance measures thus assessed an in-
dividual’s dissimilarity to the rest of a team. These
dissimilarities were calculated for all executive
management team members, both migrants and in-
cumbents. To obtain a single general proxy for how
far an individual was from the rest of the team he or
she was entering or leaving, we standardized each
of the four distance measures and calculated their
average. This measure, demographic distance, was
the variable used in the analyses reported below.
Note that we decided to use an overall distance
measure for substantive reasons. Priem, Lyon, and
Dess observed this: “Changing a top management’s
demographic profile typically involves replacing
one or more members of the TMT, but such changes
do not affect the group uniformly along every de-
mographic dimension. . . . Thus, replacing one or
more TMT members likely will not affect all demo-
graphic variables uniformly; a new member may
increase tenure heterogeneity, decrease age hetero-
geneity, leave functional heterogeneity unchanged,
and so on, within the TMT” (1999: 941). This state-
ment implies that the distance of a manager from
other team members can best be assessed by cumu-
lating (uncorrelated) distances along several di-
mensions. In other words, for our purposes dis-
tance was best operationally defined as an additive
measure (see also Schaubroeck & Lam, 2002).
According to the so-called strategic contingen-
cies theory of intraorganizational power, members
of or groups in an organization derive power from
being able to deal with the critical issues that the
organization faces (Hambrick, 1981; Hickson, Hin-
ings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971). This ability
depends on the saliency and extent of the resources
an individual or a group can contribute to tackle
these contingencies. In a managerial context, it is
clear that information and expertise are major
sources of power, because both provide decision
makers with the necessary resources for sound de-
cision making. Powell (1990) noted that effective
managerial functioning in publishing in particular
requires a thorough understanding of the ins and
outs of the business. As Powell argued, industry-
specific, idiosyncratic knowledge is very important
in any type of “relational market.” So management
teams embodying much organizational and indus-
try know-how are likely to be relatively powerful in
the publishing industry.
To assess the know-how of a manager in the
present study, we used the proxies of career path
and industry experience as defined above. Execu-
tive managers with more than three years of indus-
try experience who had made careers inside their
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current organizations were likely to be the most
knowledgeable. Following Westphal and Zajac
(1995), we assumed that power basically derives
from asymmetry in the information and knowledge
of an executive management team and a board of
directors. Therefore, to obtain a measure of relative
executive management team power, we subtracted
the proportion of board members originating from
inside a company from the proportion of manage-
ment team members originating from inside the
company. We weighted these proportions with av-
erage top team and board tenure, respectively, as
one can assume that the impact of information
asymmetry increases when the average manage-
ment team tenure is higher than average board ten-
ure. The same procedure was followed with regard
to industry experience, and we standardized and
summed the two measures to obtain one proxy for
the executive management teams’ relative power.
Organizational performance was measured as
yearly gross return on sales (ROS) and as the dif-
ference in ROS from year t 1 to year t. In this way,
we included the effect of both the absolute level of
and the change in a firm’s performance. To capture
firm diversification, we calculated a Herfindahl in-
dex (that is, the sum of squared proportions) on the
spread of firm turnover in ten different activities,
particularly newspapers, journals, books, advertis-
ing circulars, professional journals, printing busi-
nesses, sales, databases, television, and scientific
publications. Heavy reliance on a few activities
(low diversification) would raise the Herfindahl
index. By subtracting this index from 1, we ob-
tained a positive measure of diversification.1 For
our final independent variable, firm-level compet-
itive intensity, we subtracted each firm’s yearly net
turnover growth rate from those of its four Big Five
competitors combined. The idea underlying this
calculation was that crowding occurs, and compet-
itive pressures are most severely felt, when a focal
company’s growth lags behind that of its major
competitors.2
Finally, several control variables were used.
Three dummy variables corrected for the aftermath
of three major consolidation events: the acquisition
of NDU by Elsevier in 1978, the acquisition of Au-
det by VNU in 1988, and the acquisition of Tijl by
Wegener in 1988. Firm size was measured as total
capital invested (that is, total assets). As we in-
tended to explain shifts in executive management
team heterogeneity resulting from entry into and
exit from teams, we deemed it important to control
for ex ante average team heterogeneity—heteroge-
neity in the year before an event took place (that is,
t  1). By doing so, we assured that the initial
conditions with respect to team composition were
comparable across teams. The team heterogeneity
measure was an average index based on the stan-
dardized dispersion values of the same four demo-
graphic variables used to measure demographic
distance: team standard deviation of age, and Her-
findahl indexes of team industry experience, career
path, and academic status. In the exit analyses, we
controlled for an individual’s age and tenure on a
team. Finally, we also included a dummy variable
to indicate whether the member was the CEO or
not.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports the averages and standard de-
viations of the main variables per publisher for
the entire 25-year period, as well as for five
5-year periods. Publishers are ordered by de-
creasing size.
Comparing the five 5-year periods reveals a
remarkable stability over time. All publishers ex-
perienced a steady rise in total assets, and VNU
remained the biggest, challenged only by NDU/
Elsevier from the late 1970s onward. Long-run
performance (ROS) figures among the Big Five
were around 10 percent, with De Telegraaf occu-
pying a sustainable leadership position. Only one
publisher recorded a loss during a single year
(Wegener, in 1982). The degree of diversification
was generally rather high, being either main-
tained (Wegener and VNU) or developed (NDU/
Elsevier and Telegraaf) over time. Only one pub-
lisher, Perscombinatie, stuck quite “close to its
1 Note that our diversification measure does not
weight for the relatedness of the ten activities. We tried to
develop a weighting scheme on the basis of assessments
by experts. However, both intra- and interrater reliabili-
ties of the extent of relatedness of the different activities
turned out to be extremely low. Therefore, we decided to
use a simple Herfindahl index.
2 For an alternative proxy, we computed a niche over-
lap measure, calculated as a weighted average of the per
niche measure of competition in relative sales terms. We
decided not to report the results for this competitive
intensity measure, as it reveals a negative correlation
with the diversification variable above the .9 level. In
addition, it is likely that the relative growth variable used
in the main text is much more clearly linked to a top
management team’s perception of competition than the
fine-grained niche overlap one, as the former provides
direct feedback about competitive positions in the mar-
ketplace in the form of an easy-to-understand summary
statistic.
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knitting.” As the yearly turnover growth figures
varied strongly over time, so did the experienced
gap with major competitors, labeled “competitive
intensity” in the tables. Two publishers managed
to be, on the average, on a par with the competi-
tion; two were ahead; and one (VNU) lagged be-
hind. Apparently, VNU, although the largest, had
difficulty maintaining a turnover growth rate
comparable to its major competitors’. All four
competitors of NDU/Elsevier experienced a max-
imum level of competitive intensity in 1979, the
year of the NDU/Elsevier acquisition, as makes
logical sense.
The 40 entrants had an average age of 48 years
(s.d.  6.7). Of these executives, 75 percent had
industry experience, 60 percent held academic de-
grees, and 58 percent had been promoted from
within their companies. The average age of the 38
exiters was 57 (s.d.  6.6), of whom 84 percent had
industry experience, 53 percent held academic de-
grees, and 79 percent had been promoted inter-
nally. Figure 1 depicts the pattern of entries and
exits over our 25-year period, and Figure 2 depicts
the entrants’ and exiters’ demographic distance
from the teams.
As Figure 1 reveals, the evolution of team muta-
tions does not seem to be associated with any pe-
riod. Replacement is by far the most common fea-
ture of executive team turnover dynamics.
Typically, an exiting member is replaced by an
entrant in the year of exit or one year later. About
25 percent of the exiting team members were not
replaced within two years, leading to a temporary
reduction in the affected executive team’s size. Of
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Big Five Dutch Publishers in Five-Year Periodsa
Variable and
Publisher 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94
Entire period:
1970–94
Firm sizeb
VNU 457,442 (81,603) 547,022 (79,598) 650,410 (52,707) 715,534 (206,171) 1,133,761 (88,064) 700,834 (260,572)
NDU/Elsevier 146,171 (44,135) 265,678 (115,499) 509,671 (36,686) 605,791 (108,504) 1,141,845 (155,625)d 480,960 (326,591)
Telegraaf 56,368 (17,805) 131,256 (31,350) 240,404 (56,857) 436,066 (82,303) 671,775 (69,847) 307,174 (233,097)
Wegener 26,926 (6,894) 53,906 (17,907) 169,706 (39,536) 229,902 (43,892) 418,811 (96,623) 179,850 (151,047)
Perscombinatie 60,769 (7,143) 66,298 (3,467) 75,670 (5,493) 123,925 (14,746) 190,532 (35,336) 103,439 (52,487)
Performance
VNU .10 (.01) .10 (.02) .08 (.01) .12 (.01) .13 (.01) .10 (.02)
NDU/Elsevier .06 (.01) .08 (.02) .07 (.02) .15 (.02) .17 (.01)d .10 (.05)
Telegraaf .19 (.05) .17 (.01) .17 (.02) .16 (.02) .18 (.01) .17 (.03)
Wegener .12 (.02) .08 (.02) .05 (.04) .08 (.03) .12 (.01) .09 (.04)
Perscombinatie .08 (.01) .05 (.02) .03 (.03) .09 (.01) .11 (.01) .07 (.03)
Change in
performance
VNU .01 (.01)c .00 (.01) .00 (.02) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
NDU/Elsevier .00 (.01)c .00 (.03) .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .01 (.01)d .00 (.02)
Telegraaf .01 (.06)c .01 (.01) .00 (.03) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.03)
Wegener .01 (.03)c .00 (.02) .01 (.07) .01 (.04) .00 (.01) .00 (.04)
Perscombinatie .01 (.02)c .00 (.02) .00 (.04) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.02)
Diversification
VNU .67 (.01) .67 (.01) .73 (.03) .80 (.03) .82 (.03) .74 (.07)
NDU/Elsevier .48 (.01) .56 (.14) .80 (.01) .74 (.04) .68 (.02)d .65 (.14)
Telegraaf .20 (.07) .43 (.05) .50 (.00) .50 (.00) .52 (.02) .43 (.13)
Wegener .63 (.00) .63 (.00) .63 (.00) .63 (.01) .65 (.04) .63 (.02)
Perscombinatie .27 (.04) .12 (.01) .14 (.02) .13 (.02) .16 (.19) .16 (.10)
Competitive
intensity
VNU .09 (.09)c .16 (.22) .01 (.02) .05 (.11) .07 (.12) .05 (.14)
NDU/Elsevier .07 (.12)c .31 (.67) .01 (.02) .03 (.12) .00 (.10) .07 (.32)
Telegraaf .07 (.11)c .02 (.21) .01 (.07) .04 (.04) .03 (.19) .00 (.13)
Wegener .18 (.20)c .02 (.16) .06 (.21) .05 (.11) .11 (.21) .08 (.17)
Perscombinatie .02 (.05)c .04 (.19) .03 (.04) .04 (.07) .11 (.32) .00 (.17)
a Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b Total assets are in thousands of Dutch guilders.
c Starting year (1970) lost in calculating changes.
d Excludes 1993 and 1994 (missing data).
642 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
the entries, 37 percent were not preceded or fol-
lowed by exit within a symmetric two-year win-
dow, producing (temporary) team growth. Figure
2’s distance plots show no decreasing or increasing
trend in entrants’ and exiters’ demographic dis-
tance from other team members over our 25-year
period. That is, there was no systematic tendency
over time to select more similar or more dissimilar
FIGURE 1
Pattern of Top Team Member Entry and Exit
FIGURE 2
Distance from Teama
a For entrants, n  40; for exiters, n  38.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Entering Top Management Team Membersa
Variable Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Demographic
distance index
0.00 0.66 1.34 1.77
2. Age distance 8.84 5.05 1.00 23.35 .65*
3. Career path distance 0.68 0.34 0.00 1.00 .63* .17
4. Industry experience
distance
0.38 0.42 0.00 1.00 .57* .20 .09
5. Academic status
distance
0.39 0.43 0.00 1.00 .52* .02 .28* .08
6. Team power 0.29 0.96 3.89 2.19 .09 .15 .09 .09 .23
Need for diversity
7. Performance 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.20 .18 .18 .08 .27* .03 .10
8. Change in
performance
0.00 0.02 0.07 0.02 .15 .21 .03 .19 .11 .37* .61*
9. Firm diversification 0.56 0.21 0.11 0.84 .23 .09 .05 .19 .35* .20 .28* .38*
10. Competitive
intensity
0.01 0.18 0.69 0.34 .01 .01 .11 .04 .10 .11 .06 .17 .07
Control variables
11. Firm sizeb 421,244.00 307,292.00 58,987.00 1,142,568.00 .06 .09 .10 .12 .26 .03 .46* .37* .72* .14
12. NDU/Elsevier
acquisition
0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 .01 .11 .16 .11 .11 .11 .01 .14 .33* .01 .22
13. Audet acquisition 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 .16 .14 .07 .01 .31* .08 .21 .17 .39* .23 .71* .11
14. Tijl acquisition 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 .13 .05 .01 .31* .03 .09 .08 .14 .15 .14 .04 .11 .11
15. Team heterogeneity 0.002 0.50 0.99 0.92 .20 .06 .15 .42* .32* .02 .10 .04 .53* .08 .16 .00 .33* .17
a n  40.
b Total assets are in thousands of Dutch guilders.
* p  .05
One-tailed test.
top management team members. Again, a period
effect appears to be absent.3
Below, we first deal with the entry analyses (Hy-
potheses 2, 4, and 5), and then with the exit ones
(Hypotheses 1, 3, 6, and 7). Table 2 summarizes the
remaining entry descriptive statistics for entries, and
Table 3 shows the results from the entry analyses.
The dependent variable in Table 3 is the demo-
graphic distance of an entrant from the team en-
tered.4 Models 1 and 2 report “main effects,” and
interactions are added one by one in models 3 to 5.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the similarity of entrants
to incumbent team members will be larger in the
case of more powerful executive management
teams. The sign of the team power variable is neg-
ative and significant in the analysis with change in
performance, as expected (model 2 of Table 3), but
it is negative and insignificant in the regression
with absolute performance (model 1). Thus, Hy-
pothesis 2 receives partial support.
As far as Hypothesis 4 is concerned, we expected
performance to have a negative effect on entrants’
demographic distance from incumbent top manage-
ment team members, and we expected diversifica-
tion profile and competitive intensity to produce a
positive effect on entrants’ distance. As it happens,
however, we saw the exact opposite pattern of re-
sults with respect to performance change and firm
diversification. Deteriorating firm performance
seemed to lower the entrants’ distance from incum-
bent team members; the coefficient of the perfor-
mance change variable is significant (p  .01) in
model 2 of Table 3. A significant, negative effect
was found for firm diversification (model 1, p 
.05; model 2, p  .001), indicating that more diver-
sified companies hired more similar entrants. Com-
petitive intensity had an insignificant effect on en-
trant distance. Overall, we observed a tendency for
the executive teams of poorly performing and
highly diversified organizations to select “likes,” or
new team members similar to themselves, so Hy-
pothesis 4 must be rejected.
Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicts an interaction be-
tween team power and need for diversity. Here,
given the main effect results, we only report the
analyses with the change in performance variable.5
The significance levels of the cross-product terms
in models 3–5 in Table 3 indicate that a significant
interaction (p  .05) emerges only for team power
and competitive intensity. This interaction indi-
cates that the negative effect of team power on
entrant dissimilarity increases with competitive in-
tensity: The more intense the competition, the
more likely powerful teams are to hire likes. Thus,
although competitive intensity is assumed to in-
crease the need for diversity, it in fact strengthens
the negative effect team power has on entrant de-
mographic distance. This finding runs counter to
Hypothesis 5, which is therefore also rejected.
To analyze the exit process, we compared exiting
team members with the individuals in the execu-
tive management teams they left behind (the in-
cumbents) year by year. We thus tried to predict 38
exits in the context of 323 nonexits (incumbents’
failure to leave teams), thus examining 361 obser-
vations. Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics re-
lated to the variables used in the exit analyses
reported below, and Table 5 provides the results of
estimating the piecewise constant-rate models pre-
dicting the hazard of exit.
We split the team tenure of the managers by trial
and error into four durations to describe the tenure
dependence of the exit rate. The durations were
zero to three, three to five, five to ten, and more
than ten years. These choices were based on careful
observation of the distribution of team exits relative
to tenure and on model fit comparisons with mod-
els using other tenure durations. Finer splits
tended to substantially reduce the goodness-of-fit
statistics of the models. Each model shows that the
impact of tenure on exit follows an inverted U-
shape (Table 5). Apparently, the exit rate first in-
creases and is highest for managers with tenure
between three and five years, and then gradually
decreases again with increasing tenure. This pat-
tern suggests an extended honeymoon period in the
first part of top executive managers’ tenure. Note
that the hazard of exit is lowest in the first three
years of tenure, reflecting a kind of probation pe-
riod for newcomers. As common sense would sug-
gest, all models show a strong, positive effect of
age: the older a manager gets, the higher the likeli-
hood of her or his leaving a team, a relationship
partly driven by forced retirement. As far as orga-
3 This suggests that, apparently, top manager selection
was not influenced by shifts in fashion, opinion, or reg-
ulation as to the desirability or legitimacy of particular
top team features.
4 For a robustness check, we ran separate analyses for
all four distance measures individually, for both entries
and exits. By and large, the results are similar to those for
the aggregated distance measure. Therefore, we decided
to report the latter only. Detailed results are available
upon request from the first author.
5 Specifically, in the models with interaction effects (3
to 5 in Table 3) we decided to include change in profit-
ability in the regressions and not absolute profitability, as
the latter’s main effect appeared to be insignificant (see
model 1 of Table 3).
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nizational characteristics are concerned, Table 5 re-
veals a systematic, positive impact of organizational
size and a strong, negative effect of profitability on the
hazard rate.6 Executive turnover appears to be higher
in large organizations. Interestingly, it decreases
when publishers are performing well. Apparently,
poor organizational performance boosts executive
exit, either voluntary or involuntarily.
Hypothesis 1 predicts a higher hazard of exit for
those members showing more distance from the
executive management teams of which they are
members. The positive significance of the demo-
graphic distance variable (with p  .01 in models 1
and 2 of Table 5) clearly supports this hypothesis.
This finding is consistent with previous research in
the field (Carroll & Harrison, 1998). Contrary to
Hypothesis 3, however, the distance effect does not
seem to depend upon (that is, is not moderated by)
a team’s organizational power base (model 3 of
Table 5), as the coefficient estimate is insignifi-
cant.7 Hypothesis 6 predicts a rational diminution
6 Interestingly, it follows from comparing the results in
Tables 3 and 5 that the entry selection process seems to be
driven more by within-firm changes in performance,
whereas absolute, market-level profitability is more impor-
tant in the exit process. Maybe this is because top manage-
ment teams have less control over the exit process than over
the entry process. That is, exit events include both volun-
tary and involuntary departure from firms. It is not unlikely
that executives pay more attention to market-level, be-
tween-firm performance differences when considering
switching from one organization to another.
7 In Table 5’s exit analyses, we only include absolute
profitability in the models with interaction variables (see
columns 3 to 6), because, in the exit case (as opposed to
the entry case; see note 5), the main effect of change in
profitability is not significant (see model 2 of Table 5).
TABLE 3
Results of OLS Regression Analysis of Entrants’ Demographic Distance from Incumbent Team Membersa
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.63 1.68*** 1.54** 1.46** 1.57**
(0.43) (0.47) (0.49) (0.52) (0.46)
Firm size 1.42 E-06 2.11 E-06** 2.04 E-06** 2.12 E-06** 1.90 E-06**
(8.84 E-07) (7.76 E-07) (7.79 E-07) (7.77 E-07) (7.60 E-07)
Audet acquisitionb 0.99 1.24* 1.17* 1.25* 0.95*
(0.61) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.56)
Team heterogeneity 0.36 0.71* 0.56 0.73* 0.54*
(0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32)
Team power 0.15 0.34** 0.22 0.04 0.34**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.33) (0.12)
Performance 3.09
(2.30)
Change in performance 22.14** 23.63** 22.46** 21.81**
(7.15) (7.29) (7.15) (6.92)
Firm diversification 2.50* 4.19*** 3.99*** 3.84** 3.84**
(1.10) (1.13) (1.15) (1.19) (1.11)
Competitive intensity 0.31 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.27
(0.58) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53) (0.53)
Team power  change in performance 3.82
(3.73)
Team power  firm diversification 0.53
(0.53)
Team power  competitive intensity 1.42*
(0.80)
F 1.34 2.71* 2.50* 2.49* 2.93**
R2 .23 .37 .39 .39 .43
Adjusted R2 .06 .23 .24 .23 .28
a Standard errors are in parentheses. n  40.
b The coefficient estimates of the two other consolidation events were insignificant. Given the low number of observations, we therefore
dropped these two dummy variables from the analyses reported here.
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
One-tailed tests.
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TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics for Exiting Top Management Team Membersa
Variable Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Individual exit 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
2. Demographic
distance index
0.01 0.57 1.20 1.57 .08
3. Age distance 8.92 3.69 1.00 21.32 .07 .45*
4. Career path distance 0.66 0.32 0.00 1.00 .04 .73* .14*
5. Industry experience
distance
0.35 0.40 0.00 1.00 .02 .59* .02 .30*
6. Academic status
distance
0.43 0.42 0.00 1.00 .04 .47* .14* .19* .01
7. Team power 0.12 0.70 3.90 1.46 .00 .22* .11* .03 .32* .30*
Need for diversity
8. Performance 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.25 .06 .04 .00 .14* .06 .17* .04
9. Change in
performance
0.00 0.02 0.07 0.10 .03 .08 .18* .02 .02 .01 .03 .24*
10. Firm
diversification
0.57 0.21 0.06 0.85 .03 .45* .06 .19* .26* .50* .08 .06 .00
11. Competitive
intensity
0.01 0.22 1.49 0.55 .02 .06 .10* .11* .22* .10* .10* .04 .18* .10*
Control variables
12. Firm sizeb 454.0 305.0 44.00 1,271.00 .03 .23* .16* .00 .06 .29* .15* .27* .02 .72* .01
13. NDU/Elsevier
acquisition
0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 .03 .05 .16* .08 .35* .31* .21* .06 .05 .39* .22* .31*
14. Audet acquisition 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 .04 .35* .17* .16* .18* .28* .32* .08 .02 .34* .06 .57* .13*
15. Tijl acquisition 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 .09* .15* .01 .02 .24* .11* .10* .02 .12* .09* .13* .07 .12* .08
16. CEO 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 .03 .05 .03 .02 .02 .05 .02 .01 .05 .13* .00 .10 .05 .01 .01
17. Team heterogeneity 0.13 0.50 0.99 1.35 .03 .83* .30* .54* .53* .47* .27* .02 .11* .42* .09 .24* .02 .42* .17* .00
18. Team tenure 8.48 5.57 1.00 26.00 .03 .00 .05 .03 .03 .00 .15* .19* .04 .01 .08 .18* .03 .15* .11* .28* .00
19. Age of manager 52.81 6.53 37.00 66.00 .20* .13* .13* .12* .15* .10* .04 .19* .06 .07 .01 .12* .25* .01 .04 .29* .05 .39*
a n  361.
b Total assets, in millions of Dutch guilders.
* p  .05
One-tailed test.
of a team’s self-reproduction rate when need for
diversity is high. However, only one of the three
interaction terms is significant (models 4 to 6 in
Table 5). The positively significant result for the
distance by diversification interaction (with p 
.05) runs against Hypothesis 6’s prediction. Appar-
ently, top management teams remove dissimilar
members in the face of high firm diversification.
Thus, the likelihood that dissimilar members will
leave a team is not lower if the need for diversity is
high. Taken together, these findings led us to reject
Hypothesis 6. Finally, we estimated models with
three-way interaction effects (Hypothesis 7). As
none of these produced significant findings, we do
TABLE 5
Results of Exponential Hazard Models of Exits from Top Management Teamsa
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Team tenure, 0–3 years 9.82*** 10.06*** 9.75*** 9.53*** 8.58*** 9.81***
(2.06) (1.94) (2.03) (1.99) (2.32) (2.06)
Team tenure, 3–5 years 8.77*** 9.19*** 8.67*** 8.45*** 7.42*** 8.77***
(1.99) (1.93) (1.97) (1.94) (2.22) (2.00)
Team tenure, 5–10 years 9.05*** 9.60*** 8.93*** 8.65*** 7.58*** 9.05***
(2.01) (1.94) (1.99) (1.97) (2.29) (2.02)
Team tenure, 10 years 9.49*** 10.08*** 9.41*** 9.23*** 8.02*** 9.49***
(2.10) (2.03) (2.08) (2.06) (2.33) (2.10)
Age of manager 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CEO 0.85** 0.75* 0.82* 0.84* 0.91** 0.85*
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.33) (0.36)
Firm size 1.20 E-06 3.17 E-07 1.15 E-06 1.41 E-06 1.58 E-06 1.17 E-06
(9.22 E-07) (8.86 E-07) (9.43 E-07) (9.21 E-07) (1.01 E-06) (9.46 E-07)
NDU/Elsevier acquisition 0.66 0.57 0.64 0.46 0.39 0.65
(0.54) (0.61) (0.54) (0.55) (0.57) (0.54)
Audet acquisition 0.71 0.97 0.56 0.95 1.55* 0.69
(0.70) (0.78) (0.71) (0.69) (0.81) (0.71)
Tijl acquisition 1.44** 1.26** 1.41** 1.60*** 1.70*** 1.47***
(0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46)
Team heterogeneity 0.56 0.76 0.62 0.33 0.37 0.56
(0.56) (0.62) (0.57) (0.57) (0.61) (0.57)
Demographic distance 1.39** 1.48** 1.45** 0.35 0.87 1.39**
(0.52) (0.52) (0.51) (0.86) (1.23) (0.52)
Team power 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.18 0.22
(0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Performance 9.99*** 10.37*** 13.40*** 13.79*** 9.90***
(2.59) (2.77) (3.75) (3.65) (2.63)
Change in performance 0.19
(9.05)
Firm diversification 1.04 0.94 1.01 1.50 3.04* 1.02
(1.22) (1.25) (1.24) (1.25) (1.78) (1.22)
Competitive intensity 0.27 0.36 0.35 0.28 0.31 0.40
(0.76) (0.75) (0.75) (0.72) (0.79) (0.83)
Demographic distance 
team power
0.37
(0.30)
Demographic distance 
performance
9.03
(5.73)
Demographic distance 
firm diversification
3.83*
(1.93)
Demographic distance 
competitive intensity
0.53
(2.05)
Likelihood-ratio chi-square 410.18*** 329.36*** 373.58*** 340.37*** 437.99*** 417.38***
a Number of managers is 53; number of exits is 38; and number of spells is 361. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels
are based on robust standard errors (based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance) to take into account that the observations
within individuals cannot be assumed to be independent.
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
One-tailed tests.
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not report the results here. Clearly, Hypothesis 7
had to be rejected as well.
DISCUSSION
In the present research, we set out to study
whether or not executive management teams repro-
duce their own demographic characteristics
through selective hiring and firing. We expected
this process to operate provided that (1) the exec-
utive teams had enough power vis-a`-vis boards of
directors to choose new team members and (2) no
compelling organizational circumstances rendered
it more rational to disrupt this reproduction, forc-
ing the team to hire more dissimilar members. To
explore these issues, we analyzed the entry and exit
of individual executives into and from the top man-
agement teams of the five biggest Dutch newspaper
publishers over 25 years. Several interesting rela-
tionships were found, although many of our hy-
potheses based on rational-economic theory were
not supported. In fact, entry and exit into and out of
top executive management teams seemed to follow
quite another logic, at least in this sample.
Concerning entry, we found a significant ten-
dency for poor performance and high diversifica-
tion to cause executive teams to select likes, which
is exactly the opposite of our prediction. In addi-
tion, although more powerful teams do select likes,
their tendency to do so is even stronger when com-
petitive intensity increases. Concerning exit, we
found that poor performance increases the overall
likelihood of executive exit, with dissimilar man-
agers tending to leave first. Interestingly, the like-
lihood of dissimilar managers’ leaving appears to
be greater when firm diversification is high, which
was not as expected. Figures 3 and 4 depict the
interaction effect plots.
Figure 3 shows that entrant distance from a team
decreases with executive team power vis-a`-vis a
board, particularly if competitive intensity is high.
In a similar vein, Figure 4 reveals that the multi-
plier of the exit hazard rate increases with team
member distance from a team, particularly if firm
diversification is high. Taking these findings to-
gether, we conclude that team reproduction and
homogenization do indeed occur, especially when
organizations face conditions that, at first glance,
theoretically require more team diversity. Appar-
ently, top executive management teams tend to
close ranks when environmental complexity and
pressure increase. Why would teams want to close
ranks? At least two explanations can be offered.
A first explanation has a behavioral flavor, sug-
gesting that closing ranks might be a “threat-rigid-
ity” response (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).
If this is the case, we need to recast our conceptu-
alization of the rational drivers of need for diversity
in terms of circumstances threatening to an execu-
tive management team, rather than to their organi-
zation. That is, low profitability, high competitive
pressure, and increased environmental diversity
(diversification) might not only increase an execu-
tive team’s need for diversity, but may at the same
time threaten the very survival of the team. All this
may cause a team to close ranks by hiring comfort-
FIGURE 3
Interactive Effect of Team Power and Competitive Intensity on Entrant Distance from a Team
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ing similar others and dropping dissimilar manag-
ers, and thus diminishing uncertainty. Note that
this explanation is consistent with research on in-
tergroup conflict, which has shown that people are
more likely to cooperate in a social dilemma if it is
embedded in the context of intergroup conflict (for
a review, see Bornstein and Ben-Yossef [1994]).
Our findings suggest, mutatis mutandis, that exter-
nal (that is, intergroup) competitive pressure not
only induces within-group cooperation, but also
the closing of ranks. If this explanation holds true,
then executive management team metabolism is
driven more by behavioral processes at the team
level than by rational-economic factors at the orga-
nizational level, a formulation that opens up inter-
esting paths for future investigations. For instance,
it may be worthwhile to look at what happens to
team composition in the face of very disturbing
stimuli, such as performance declines and hostile
merger bids. Does closing ranks occur there as well
and, if so, does it have distinct consequences for
the (flexibility of a) team’s behavioral repertoire
and the outcomes of the performance declines and
hostile bids?
A second explanation departs from the central
assumption of our model that rational-economic
countervailing imperatives are likely to push teams
toward increasing their diversity. For instance, we
invoked the principle of requisite variety to under-
pin the benefits of diversity in certain circum-
stances. It is, however, possible that this assump-
tion leads to underestimation of “process losses”
resulting from team heterogeneity. Indeed, there is
some evidence that team-level homogeneity rather
than heterogeneity may relate positively to perfor-
mance. As many social-psychological team compo-
sition studies have shown, team heterogeneity is
associated with so-called process losses in the form
of hampered communication and increased con-
flict. These losses are in turn likely to harm team
cohesion and performance (Williams & O’Reilly,
1998). This finding has been replicated in the con-
text of top management teams (e.g., Carpenter,
2002; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001;
Michel & Hambrick, 1992). An argument is that
team heterogeneity increases decision-making time
and reduces decision-making efficiency, changes
that could be particularly harmful in the face of
high corporate diversification, poor organizational
performance, and tough market competition. In ad-
dition, high diversification, poor performance, and
tough competition are situations of uncertainty. In
the face of uncertainty, a team’s performance might
benefit from cohesiveness. Network research has
shown that in highly uncertain situations, individ-
uals are drawn to those they trust (Mizruchi &
Brewster Stearns, 2002), and individuals are more
likely to trust others who are similar to themselves
(Ibarra, 1992, 1995; Powell, 1990). In a similar vein,
much organizational ecology research emphasizes
the beneficial performance effect of organizational
inertia (Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 1996; Hannan &
Freeman, 1984; van Witteloostuijn et al., 2003),
which is likely to be positively associated with top
team homogeneity.
So, maybe the closing of ranks when perfor-
mance is low and complexity is high (given high
diversification) is not so much irrationally counter-
productive, but is rather an appropriate executive
team attempt to master the environment of a firm.
Closing ranks might increase the likelihood of ef-
fective implementation of, for instance, turnaround
strategies in the face of low performance and elab-
orating synergies in the case of high diversification.
To check the plausibility of this explanation, we
performed an analysis of the impact of average
team heterogeneity on the return on sales of our
publisher companies. If, indeed, we had overesti-
mated the benefits of executive management team
diversity, the relationship between heterogeneity
FIGURE 4
Interactive Effect of Demographic Distance and Firm Diversification on the Hazard of Exit
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and performance should be negative or at least
nonpositive. The team heterogeneity measure is the
same as the corresponding control variable used in
the analyses presented above. Table 6 reports these
results.8
The fixed-effects regression estimate clearly re-
veals a significant, negative effect of team hetero-
geneity at time t  1 on return on sales at time t
(p  .001). Thus, diversity does seem to hamper
performance, at least in the short run, in the pub-
lishing industry in The Netherlands. Closing ranks
could therefore be interpreted as an economically
rational, though not necessarily a conscious, move
in the present setting. Apparently, in this industry
the metabolism of executive management teams fits
with external selection pressures: replacing unlike
team members with like team members (team ho-
mogenization) on the one hand and firm profitabil-
ity on the other hand. Future research could inves-
tigate to what extent this is the case in other
industries, too, in order to find out in what circum-
stances the selection logic at the team level is dys-
functional or functional at the organizational level.
Apart from the extensions mentioned above, the
limitations of the current study suggest several other
potential avenues for future study. First, one might
have a closer look at the potentially important role of
the CEO (or the chairperson, in the board case) of a
management team to find out whose character is be-
ing reproduced: that of the “average team member”
(as in our study) or that of the CEO? Personal power is
likely to play a role in this process, too, as the char-
acteristics of a CEO are more likely to be reproduced
when she or he has more power vis-a`-vis the rest of
the team. We checked for this effect by running our
entry and exit analyses with measures of the demo-
graphic distance between a firm’s CEO and its en-
trants and exiters. The results (available upon request
from the first author) are substantially weaker than
those for the team-level measures used above. An
explanation may be the consensus-type culture that
dominates Dutch society, known as the polder model.
In this culture, a CEO (and even the country’s prime
minister!) is traditionally regarded as a primus inter
pares whose aim is to guide decision-making pro-
cesses toward consensus at the executive team level.
It would be interesting, though, to compare CEO and
team distance effects in different countries and indus-
tries. In a similar vein, future work could also focus
on the relative importance of the demographic char-
acteristics of board members with respect to the ho-
mosocial reproduction of top management teams. Al-
though directors are probably less directly involved
in this process, it might be interesting to investigate
whether they are indeed more prone to support new
executive candidates who share their own demo-
graphic characteristics.
Second, one could also explore the extent to
which trial-and-error learning influences how team
composition changes over time. For example, a
team might consider changing its recruitment strat-
egy depending on the organizational performance
impact of specific selection decisions made in the
past. Such a change would imply action by some
kind of performance-feedback learning mechanism
(Greve, 2003). One such mechanism involves learn-
ing to use turnover as a way to adapt team compo-
sition in response to organizational performance
feedback. Specifically, one could hypothesize that
a poorly (strongly) performing publisher will re-
place an exiting team member with an executive
8 Note that we added two additional variables to the
model in Table 6 in order to control for the potential
disruptive effect of executive change (Amburgey, Kelly,
& Barnett, 1993; Barnett & Carroll, 1995): a dummy indi-
cating CEO turnover and a variable measuring the num-
ber of team mutations in a given year.
TABLE 6
Fixed-Effects Estimates of Return on Salesa
Variable
Constant 0.16***
(0.02)
Team heterogeneity 0.03***
(0.01)
CEO turnover 0.02
(0.02)
Number of exits and entries 0.00
(0.00)
NDU/Elsevier acquisition 0.07***
(0.02)
Audet acquisition 0.01
(0.02)
Tijl acquisition 0.03*
(0.02)
Firm size 7.36 E-08***
(1.88 E-08)
Team power 0.00
(0.03)
Firm diversification 0.17***
(0.04)
Competitive intensity 0.01
(0.01)
F 6.81***
R2 .43
a n  104. Independent variables were lagged one period
except for the consolidation dummies. Standard errors are in
parentheses. A fixed-effects regression analysis with the four
demographic distance measures separately included produced
similar results (available upon request from the first author).
* p  .05
*** p  .001
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entrant who is dissimilar from (similar to) the ex-
iter. Conversely, poor performance will provide in-
centives to a team to “facilitate” the exit of the
managers who are most dissimilar from a new en-
trant. In other words, if learning occurs, in bad
times the managers entering an executive team will
be different from the departing managers they re-
place, and managers who are dissimilar from the
new entrant will be subsequently pushed out of the
team. In good times, however, departing executives
will be replaced by “clones,” and new entrants will
not put extra pressure on executives who are dif-
ferent from these entrants. To explore this idea, we
performed two additional analyses. First, we used
the entrants’ demographic distance from the last
previous exiter as the dependent variable in the
entrant OLS regression (similar to Table 3). Second,
in the exit hazard model (similar to Table 5), we
included two additional independent variables: a
manager’s distance from the last previous entrant,
and the interaction of this variable with organiza-
tional performance. None of the relevant perfor-
mance feedback coefficient estimates proved to be
significant (results are available upon request from
the first author). Hence, in our sample, there seems
to be no evidence that recruitment is calibrated
with performance-dependent replacement of ear-
lier turnover. Note, however, that the number of
replacement events in our sample is very low (36),
and that the time lag between replacement events is
often quite substantial. Therefore, future research
should focus on these learning issues in more detail
and in different settings.
A third area open to future investigations focuses
on the proper characteristics to study. Until now,
the emphasis in the study of executive teams has
been on demographic characteristics. Note, how-
ever, that these are only surrogate measures of the
real underlying constructs of interest, such as per-
sonalities and beliefs. It is self-evident that compa-
rable reproduction studies using individual per-
sonality or value measures along the lines set out
by Schneider and coauthors (1998) would add
enormously to understanding of team metabolic
processes. After all, proving that personality differ-
ences between organizations exist is one (impor-
tant) thing, but showing the (metabolic) processes
by which they arise is another matter. As it seems
fair to assume that the make-up of a management
team provides an image of the organization it man-
ages as a whole, studies of management team turn-
over could shed light on such processes. But still,
larger-scale investigations into the demographic (or
value) metabolism of higher-order social aggregates
(like organizations) would offer the true “proof of
the pudding” for ASA theory. It would involve
painstaking retrospective analyses of personnel
records, which is often a problem because of lim-
ited data accessibility or even data unavailability.
The growth of automated personnel management
systems may, however, make such studies feasible
in the near future.
Fourth, as mentioned above, in the current study
we could not observe the sorting and selection of
top management team entrants directly, but only
the result thereof. It makes sense, therefore, to look
explicitly at the nature of executive selection by
referral to the pool of possible candidates in future
research. Note that past research in the executive
succession domain has examined the similarities
between executives and their successors (e.g., Zajac
& Westphal, 1996). However, the attention to selec-
tion pools has been limited to date. Studies on heirs
apparent (Canella & Shen, 2001) as well as of other
inside directors (Zhang & Rajagopolan, 2003)—that
is, selection pool members—are clear steps in this
direction that deserve extensive follow-up. Of
course, in-depth research of this type requires ac-
cess to data on selection pools that may be hard to
obtain. In this context, detailed comparative case
study research may be attainable in the future, as is
Ruef and colleagues’ (2003) quantitative methodol-
ogy of generating the demographic distribution of
all possible teams.
Finally, keeping in mind the 1998 study by
Schneider and his colleagues, it is not inconceiv-
able that industry differences in the extent, opera-
tion, and outcome of selective turnover processes
exist as well. In other words, as we already touched
upon above, the findings of this study could be
sample specific. In this respect, we note that exec-
utive management team turnover in the Dutch pub-
lishing industry has been low over the past 25
years, resulting in relatively stable teams. It might
therefore be interesting to focus on industries with
more intensive executive team turnover in future
work. In professional industries such as account-
ing, for instance, the reproduction of core values
might be (even) more prominent and important to
effectiveness than it is in manufacturing compa-
nies. In fact, professionalization processes (“nor-
mative isomorphism”; see DiMaggio and Powell
[1983]) can be seen as the gradual shaping of a
values blueprint that serves as a selective screening
device later on. Thus, not only the shaping and
perpetuation of certain values, but also the compar-
ative study of their content between industries
seems a promising area for research. Whatever the
future research settings, we do, however, think that
more emphasis should be given to the drawbacks of
executive team diversity with respect to effective
strategy implementation, at least as far as the short-
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run performance consequences are concerned. Re-
lated to this is the need for future research to in-
clude indicators of long-run performance (such as
growth, survival, and innovation), as well as short-
term profitability measures such as those the
present study used. Long-term results are essential
to unraveling the complicated relationship be-
tween team diversity and organizational effective-
ness that exists in the longer run.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we developed and tested a longitu-
dinal model explaining diversity within top exec-
utive management teams from the perspective of
selective turnover. We drew on two theoretical per-
spectives to describe the pull toward team homog-
enization (low diversity) and the push toward team
heterogenization (high diversity). Schneider’s at-
traction-selection-attrition (ASA) model was used
to explain management teams’ natural tendency to
“hire likes and fire unlikes” (to reproduce homo-
socially), provided the teams have the power to do
so. Rational-economic theory, however, suggests
firm-specific countervailing imperatives pulling
executive teams toward heterogeneity as a means
for them to cope with environmental requirements.
We propose that the cycle of homosocial reproduc-
tion only gets interrupted when teams face a com-
pelling need for diversity, particularly when orga-
nizational performance is poor, corporate
diversification is high, and market competition is
tough, but that the reproduction cycle is main-
tained if a top executive management team is pow-
erful vis-a`-vis the board of directors of its firm.
We tested our hypotheses in a population of top
executive teams of the Big Five Dutch publishers
over a 25-year period. Interestingly, results did not
support many of our benchmark expectations. Re-
lating to entry, we found that poor performance and
high diversification caused teams to select likes.
Moreover, although more powerful teams did tend
to select likes, this tendency was stronger when
competitive intensity increased. Concerning exit,
we found that poor performance increased the
overall likelihood of executive exit and that dissim-
ilar managers tended to leave first. Interestingly,
the likelihood of dissimilar managers’ leaving a
firm appeared to be greater when firm diversifica-
tion was high. We conclude that homosocial repro-
duction does indeed occur, particularly when orga-
nizations face conditions that at first glance appear
to require growth in executive team diversity. Ap-
parently, top management teams tend to close
ranks when environmental complexity and pres-
sure increase.
The explanations and post hoc analyses we have
discussed point to new research avenues. In this
concluding section, we want to emphasize two of
them. In Dutch publishing, top management team
homogeneity rather than heterogeneity appears to
be positively related to organizational performance
measured as short-term profitability. As a result, in
our setting, homosocial reproduction does not ap-
pear to be dysfunctional, at least so far as short-
term firm profitability is concerned. This may not
be the case, though, in industries with features that
emphasize the need for creativity and innovation,
as the latter are known to be stimulated by group
heterogeneity; further, this may not be the case
when long-run organizational performance is mea-
sured. Future research in different industries and
with different performance measures might help to
clarify matters, particularly by shedding more light
on whether and how top management teams even-
tually learn to select strategies that fit environmen-
tal contingencies. The same goes for another find-
ing that may be specific to our context: that the
demographic features of a top management team as
a whole are reproduced, and not those of a CEO.
Our explanation for this result refers to the partic-
ular institutional context of Dutch society, which
highly values consensus and modesty. By linking
our top team story with insights from institutional
theory, and by performing empirical research in
widely different institutional settings, scholars may
deepen their understanding of selective turnover
and organizational performance.
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